basics' approach to the terms of Article 3, in order to highlight both its potential, and, indeed, its requirement, to achieve 'really good' outcomes for all children coming within its reach. The paper takes the position of children who offend as its focal point considering particularly how the Article should apply in their cases. Its key argument is that Article 3 mandates 'really good' outcomes for all children including, equally, for those who do wrong, a position which is fully supported by the Committee on the Rights of the Child. 8 The paper will firstly consider the negative perception of children who offend in relation to their rights. It will then turn to the terms of Article 3 itself and examine the ways in which it is incorporated into Scots law as it applies to offenders, and its application. Finally it will look at recent research reports compiled by the Centre for Youth and Criminal Justice and by the Scottish Children's Reporter Administration which shed some light on young peoples' own views of decisionmaking allegedly in their best interests. Overall, it concludes that the terms of Article 3 provide the framework to offer and achieve much more in terms of outcome than is currently the case.
B. The Rights of Children who Offend
Children who commit crime are still children and, as such, are bearers of the rights conferred by the CRC. 9 In fact, the Convention specifically recognises them as in need of greater protection in certain respects by its inclusion of Article 37 which tempers the application of criminal sanctions to the young and in Article 40 which makes provision for their right to a fair trial. Nonetheless, there is a particular rhetoric, stronger at historical moments when youth crime is a highly politicised issue, 10 that child-offenders, through their (deemed) choice to commit wrongful acts, render themselves less entitled to other, so-called, protection rights. 11 Indeed, at the extreme, some might argue that these are forfeited. 12 Raymond Arthur has explained the issue in this way, in relation to English criminal procedure:
The English youth justice system ... developed in a way which weakens and negates the protection rights stemming from the UN Convention by perpetuating the idea that if children are competent they are automatically assumed capable of negotiating their way through a liberal universe of choices, and the offender is no longer a child and no longer worthy of special protection of their rights.
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The issue arises partly because children who offend present a paradox 14 which law is not always equipped to resolve effectively. On the one hand, children, as a group, are regarded as vulnerable and in need of protection. On the other, 'offenders' are regarded as worthy of punishment because they have exercised an autonomous choice to do wrong. 'Child-offenders' belong to both of these groups at once but the law is more used to dealing with each as a separate category. Child and family law is applied to the vulnerable; criminal law applies to the offender. Children's rights, conceived as a discrete area of law, has been relatively more successful in adopting the holistic approach which is needed, in that Articles 37 and 40 specifically give cognisance to some of the unique vulnerabilities of the child-offender and Article 12 is widely recognised as at least a basic mechanism for giving credence to the child's autonomy (in the right to express views) but with some protection in that weight is to be given to these views 'in accordance with the age and maturity of the child'. 15 Nonetheless, in the context of the law as a whole, the rights of children who do wrong are not prominent and, in Scotland, there has been only very limited recourse to Articles 37 and 40.
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Another key issue is that 'the public interest' may sometimes be, or be perceived to be, in direct opposition to the interests of a child who commits a crime. For example, the CRC accords to a child 'in trouble' with the law at any stage of proceedings, a right 'to have his or her privacy fully respected'. 17 In a recent English case, a 15-year old who murdered his teacher in a pre-meditated knife attack was named by the media following a specific order by the judge, who justified this by stating that he had come down 'firmly on the side of the public interest'. 18 It cannot therefore be said that children's rights are not affected by offending behaviour. The argument is the normative one that they should not be. Even where there must be some form of balancing of competing rights -for example, the child's right not to be separated from his/her parents 19 cannot be upheld where s/he has been sentenced to a period of detention by a criminal court 20 -there is no justification for the Article 3 protection ceasing to apply. Its content, and its application in the Scottish context, will now be considered.
C. The Promise of the Best Interests Standard in Article 3
Article 3 sets the bar high in terms of expectation of outcome arising from its application. If 'best interests' are 'a primary consideration' -and Article 3 says that they shall be, not that they may be 21 -a child about to enter a decision-making process armed with this information could reasonably expect that something really good for him/her is likely to come out of it. In other words:
The expression "primary consideration" means that the child's best interests may not be considered on the same level as all other considerations. … Viewing the best interests of the child as "primary" requires a consciousness about the place that children's interests must occupy in all actions and a willingness to give priority to those interests in all circumstances, but especially when an action has an undeniable impact on the children concerned.
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How, then, is this translated into Scots law, particularly in relation to child-offenders? It is first of all necessary to explain the mechanisms by which Scots law deals with children who offend. The primary route is through the children's hearings system, one of the grounds for referral to which is that 'the child has committed an offence'. 23 Children aged eight and over may be so referred.
D. Scots Law and Children Who Offend
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It is also possible for those aged 12 and over to be prosecuted but only 'on the instructions of …, or at the instance of[,] the Lord Advocate' 25 and usually for grave offences. 26 The vast majority of child-offenders are referred to the children's hearings system, 27 which deals with such cases in the same way as those of children referred on each of its other 15 (care and protection) grounds. 28 Decisions are taken by a panel of three lay members, trained for the function and, importantly, the determinative principle is the child's welfare. It is here, then, that Article 3 finds its first direct expression in Scots law. 'Welfare' has a number of uses including the pejorative, if primarily tabloid, notion of the 'welfare scrounger'. 30 In Scottish child law, however, it has a long and well-respected history and denotes the principle that identifying and meeting hitherto unmet needs on the part of children will have a generally beneficial effect on their lives and will, specifically, operate to reduce to a vanishing point their offending behaviour. This argument is given passionate expression -quite specifically in relation to 'juvenile delinquency' -in the Kilbrandon Report of 1964 on the basis of which the children's hearings system was set up. It states:
E. Article 3 in Scots Law
The object must be to effect, so far as this can be achieved by public action, the reduction, and ideally the elimination, of delinquency. If public concern must always be for the effective treatment of delinquency, the appropriate treatment measures in any individual case can be decided only on an informed assessment of the individual child's actual needs.
31
There may be (though, in fact, this is rare) some debate as to the relationship between the Scottish legislation's preference for 'welfare' and the CRC's use of 'best interests' 32 but, here, they are used interchangeably. It would be hard to give a stronger statement of the importance of the child's welfare and this is applied to those who offend in the same way as to those referred on any other ground.
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(ii) Welfare as a Primary Consideration
In the immediately following section of the relevant Act, however, the paramountcy requirement is qualified so that the listed decision-making bodies (children's hearings, pre-hearing panels, courts) may depart from it where they deem this necessary 'for the purpose of protecting members of the public from serious harm (whether physical or not)' but, in those circumstances, the child's welfare must still be 'a primary consideration rather than the paramount consideration'. 36 This provision makes no specific reference to child-offenders yet it is hard to think of circumstances where a child is likely to cause such 'serious harm' without breaking the criminal law. In fact, this power to depart from paramountcy first appeared, in a different form, in the Children (Scotland) Act of 1995 37 With this amendment we are seeking to deal with "a little monster" in society, a person who slashes car tyres, who breaks car windows and who is out of control. What is the paramount consideration? I do not know where the word "paramount" comes from. I think it is an Americanism, but it is a horrible word. It does not mean anything, but anyway it is in the Bill. Where does paramountcy go in achieving the balance between society and the individual?
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The shift away from paramountcy, then, seems to have been conceived as an intentional, government-sanctioned, dilution of the rights of children who offend with no clear statement of the way in which their welfare was to be considered instead. 39 In the current (2011) version of the provision, this public (safety) interest is only to be balanced in alongside best interests, which remain primary. It does not trump them. This can be taken as a welcome recognition that children's rights matter though, clearly, there is still some diminution between best interests as paramount and as a primary consideration.
But are these apparently different standards of best interests meaningful? What is the difference in practice between paramountcy and primacy in this context? There appears to be no reported case in which this power to depart from the paramountcy principle has been considered. This makes it difficult to know how to determine the difference in law between 'paramount' and 'primary' for these purposes. Indeed, the official training manual for children ' the existence of the provision demonstrates that it is permissible to give less prominence to the welfare of children who are deemed a risk to public safety than to that of others, there is little to indicate that this is actually being done in the practice of the children's hearings system.
(iii) Welfare of Prosecuted Children
The final Scottish provision meriting consideration in the Article 3 context relates specifically to children who are prosecuted. It also considerably pre-dates both the CRC and the children's hearings system 41 yet it still occupies the territory of welfare-based approaches. It states:
Every court in dealing with a child who is brought before it as an offender shall have regard to the welfare of the child and shall in a proper case take steps for removing him from undesirable surroundings. proceedings -suggests the former. Again, a dearth of case law makes it difficult to put the matter beyond doubt.
F. The Temporal Dimension and Paternalism
This inquiry also brings into focus the temporal dimension of Article 3 and its domestic Scottish derivatives. In other words, for how long must the child's welfare weigh in the making of the decision? The Scottish paramountcy provision is unequivocal that decision-makers must take it into account 'throughout the child's childhood'. Article 3 and the Scottish public safety exception both make best interests primary, thereby giving it at least some longevity beyond the moment of making the decision, since it will continue to operate as the decision is implemented.
On the face of it, this seems to enhance its overarching 'real goodness' for the child. Not only must a decision-maker have that child's best interests in mind at the moment of making the decision but also for (possibly) years to come. In fact, however, as far as the child is concerned, this need to look to the future may operate to allow a particularly adultist or paternalist approach to come to the fore. The child's wishes and his/her welfare are not the same even if these wishes (or 'views') 43 should be taken into account in determining best interests. Child-friendly statements of the principle of Article 3 make clear just how little weight needs to be conferred on these wishes however. UNICEF states:
All adults should do what is best for you. When adults make decisions, they should think about how their decisions will affect children.
The Scottish Government states:
If a decision is being made by any organisation about your well-being, then your interests must be considered when making the final decision. What is best for YOU is what matters. For example, if a local authority is planning a new road they have to think about how their plans affect your safety.
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The child who has read the original Article and is expecting a decision in which his/her best interests are, at least, a primary consideration will realise that it is an adult view of his/her good which is definitive. Adults have also, by definition, proceeded to the end of the period of the lifespan called childhood. There may be an argument that this equips them to know better how a decision will bear 'throughout' that period than the child who is in the midst of it. If this revelation is disappointing for a child expecting his/her own version of the 'really good' to emerge from a process, it does not detract from the overarching principle that the outcome should still be 'really good'. To what extent is this the case? The paper will look firstly at prosecuted children and then at those who are processed through the children's hearings system.
G. The Best Interests of Children who are Prosecuted
Only a very small number of children (for this purpose, those aged 17 and under) are prosecuted in the adult courts. At the outset of this process, a decision will have been taken jointly to refer such a child to the reporter to the children's panel and to the procurator fiscal to decide whether his/her case should be processed through the children's hearings system or by prosecution. It is noteworthy that the Lord Advocate's Guidelines, 45 which govern this process, make no reference to the childaccused's best interests, though the existence of Article 3 is at least noted in the Crown Office' that the court has no difficulty with the proposition that, when sentencing a child for any offence, the sentence selected ought to take into account, as a primary consideration, the welfare of the child and the desirability of his reintegration into society. It is not the only primary consideration, since the legislation requires that the seriousness of the offence be taken into account and that the period selected satisfies the requirements for retribution and deterrence. But it is one. In this way, the sentencing of a child will differ in the degree of emphasis or weight placed on the welfare of the person sentenced. With an adult, it is also a consideration, but it may not always be categorised as a primary one, at least where murder is concerned.
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Subsequent cases have also articulated the principle but the emphasis on welfare as only one among a number of important considerations means that the outcome is not always necessarily in the to the types of information which should be obtained in deciding whether to prosecute (eg 'views of local authority Children's and Young People's Service' in relation to rape and other offences against children (where the defendant is also a child) system. The 21 young participants in the study were aged between 11 and 17 and had experience of the hearings system, some in relation to offending behaviour. 62 The two studies are partly concerned with the participants' experience of the children's hearings process. In principle, Article 3 relates to decisions and their consequences. Article 12 which affords to the child who wishes to do so the right to express views and have these taken into account seems more directly relevant to process. There is, however, a close link between views and decisions such that the Committee on the Rights of the Child has specifically stated that 'there can be no correct 56 (Glasgow: Space Unlimited, 2015).
On the one hand then, these young people do not report that the decision of the children's hearing was 'really good' for them -that as a direct consequence of it, their lives improved. On the other, there is a sense that they themselves converted a, probably paternalistic, decision about what would be best for them, into a catalyst for positive change. They reclaimed their agency to achieve the good outcome. Thus, if the hearing's decision was not 'really good', it was, equally, not wholly bad.
'Welfare as being paramount throughout childhood' became 'an improved life'.
I. Conclusion
Overall then, in its clear terms, Article 3 holds out considerable promise of 'really good' outcomes for all children in respect of whom official decisions are taken including, on the same terms, those who offend. Within the children's hearings setting, the commitment to welfare is paramount. In other words, it could not have greater significance yet the young people about whom its decisions are taken do not always experience its decisions as 'really good'. For children who are prosecuted, the status of best interests as a primary consideration may allow other primary considerations to be balanced in alongside, rather than the overarching concentration on welfare, rehabilitation and reintegration into society which the UN children's rights regime, taken as a whole, envisages. Article
